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JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
Victor Aguilar petitions for review of a decision of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) ordering that he be 
removed because he was convicted of “sexual assault” under 
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3124.1 (“§ 3124.1”), which the BIA 
determined was a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) 
(“§ 16(b)”), and therefore an aggravated felony under 8 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F).  Aguilar asserts that crimes 
involving a minimum mens rea of recklessness cannot be 
crimes of violence under § 16(b).  Accordingly, he argues 
that, because the minimum mens rea necessary for conviction 
under § 3124.1 is recklessness, the BIA erred in finding that 
his conviction constituted a crime of violence under § 16(b).  
Contrary to Aguilar‟s assertion, however, our precedent does 
not foreclose the possibility that a reckless crime can be a 
crime of violence under § 16(b).  Because sexual assault, as 
defined by § 3124.1, raises a substantial risk that the 
perpetrator will intentionally use force in furtherance of the 
offense, we agree with the BIA that it constitutes a crime of 
violence under § 16(b).  We will therefore deny Aguilar‟s 
petition. 
 
I. Background 
 
In 2000, Aguilar, a native and citizen of Honduras, 
was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent 
resident.  Four years later, in the Court of Common Pleas of 
Berks County, Pennsylvania, he was found guilty of both 
sexual assault, a second degree felony, under § 3124.1,
1
 and 
                                              
1
 Section 3124.1 makes it an offense to “engage[] in 
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indecent assault, a second degree misdemeanor, under 18 PA. 
CONS. STAT. § 3126(a)(2).  He was sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment of forty-six months to eight years, followed by 
two years of probation.  In that same proceeding, the jury 
found Aguilar not guilty of rape under 18 PA. CONS. STAT. 
§ 3121(a)(1).
2
  Based on those felony and misdemeanor 
convictions, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) 
issued Aguilar a Notice to Appear, charging him as 
removable under INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), because he had been convicted of a 
crime of violence under § 16(b) and hence an aggravated 
felony as defined by 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F).
3
   
                                                                                                     
sexual intercourse or deviate sexual intercourse with a 
complainant without the complainant‟s consent.”  18 PA. 
CONS. STAT. § 3124.1. 
2
 Pursuant to 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3121(a)(1), “[a] 
person commits a felony of … first degree [rape] when the 
person engages in sexual intercourse with a complainant … 
by forcible compulsion.” 
3
 The definition of “aggravated felony” includes “a 
crime of violence (as defined in [§ 16], but not including a 
purely political offense) for which the term of imprisonment 
[is] at least one year.”  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F).  The Notice 
to Appear also charged Aguilar as removable under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(i), for having been convicted of a crime 
involving moral turpitude within five years of his admission, 
for which a sentence of at least one year or longer may be 
imposed.  However, neither the Immigration Judge nor the 
BIA addressed that charge because both found that Aguilar‟s 
sexual assault conviction under § 3124.1 provided a ground 
for his removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).  Thus, 
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Section 16(b) defines a “crime of violence” as “any 
other offense [not described in § 16(a)
4
] that is a felony and 
that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical 
force against the person or property of another may be used in 
the course of committing the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 16(b).  In 
an “Interlocutory Ruling on Aggravated Felony,” the 
Immigration Judge (“IJ”) “sustain[ed] the aggravated felony 
ground of removal under [8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)].”  
(AR at 86.)  The IJ held that, since “[t]he confrontation 
inherent in engaging in non-consensual sexual or deviant 
intercourse” creates a substantial risk that physical force may 
be used in the course of committing the offense, sexual 
assault under § 3124.1 is a crime of violence under § 16(b).  
(Id.)  The IJ reasoned that, although § 3124.1 “cover[s] those 
occasions where a victim is compelled to engage in sexual 
intercourse or deviant sexual intercourse without consent 
even where no force was applied,” (AR at 85), § 16(b) can 
nevertheless cover offenses under § 3124.1 because § 16(b) 
only requires “a substantial risk that physical force may be 
used against the person in the course of committing the 
offense,” (AR at 86). 
 
Aguilar appealed to the BIA.  Like the IJ, the BIA 
reasoned that “even if the intercourse required by [§ 3124.1] 
                                                                                                     
although Aguilar‟s convictions may well qualify as crimes 
involving moral turpitude, that issue is not before us. 
4
 Section 16(a) defines a “crime of violence” as “an 
offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force against the person or property 
of another.”  18 U.S.C. § 16(a). 
 6 
 
is accomplished without physical force or physical resistance, 
the offense of penetrating another person without [that 
person‟s] consent necessarily disregards the substantial risk of 
physical force being used to actually overcome the victim‟s 
lack of consent.”  (AR at 4.)  Thus, the BIA dismissed the 
appeal.   
 
Aguilar has timely petitioned us for review.   
 
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 
Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), we have jurisdiction to 
consider “„questions of law raised upon a petition for review,‟ 
including petitions for review of removal orders based on 
aggravated felony convictions.”5  Tran v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 
464, 467 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D)).  
Since the interpretation of criminal provisions “is a task 
outside the BIA‟s special competence and congressional 
delegation … [and] very much a part of this Court‟s 
competence,” our review is de novo.  See id. (noting that de 
novo review is appropriate in the context of interpreting the 
criminal provisions of Title 18 of the United States Code). 
 
                                              
5
 The IJ had jurisdiction over Aguilar‟s original 
removal proceeding pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a, and the 
BIA, in turn, had jurisdiction to consider Aguilar‟s appeal 
pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(3).   
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III. Discussion 
 
A. The Categorical Approach 
 
This case requires us to interpret the meaning and 
application of the type of aggravated felony defined by statute 
as a “crime of violence.”  See Singh v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 
144, 150 (3d Cir. 2004)  (noting that whether a petitioner has 
been convicted of an aggravated felony “turns on a question 
of statutory interpretation”).  First, we must ascertain the 
definition of a “crime of violence” under the enumerating 
statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F), which incorporates § 16(b) 
by reference, and second, we must compare that federal 
definition to the statute of conviction, namely sexual assault 
under § 3124.1.  Restrepo v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 617 F.3d 
787, 791 (3d Cir. 2010).  Case law refers to this kind of 
analysis as the “categorical approach” to determining whether 
a state law conviction constitutes an aggravated felony under 
federal law.  Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 601 
(1990).  Applying the categorical approach, “we look to the 
elements of the statutory state offense, not to the specific facts 
[of the case], reading the applicable statute to ascertain the 
least culpable conduct necessary to sustain conviction under 
the statute.”  Denis v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 633 F.3d 201, 
206 (3d Cir. 2011) (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted).
6
   
                                              
6
 The categorical approach will not always suffice.  
“Where … a statute criminalizes different kinds of conduct, 
some of which would constitute [aggravated felonies] while 
others would not,” we turn to a modified categorical 
approach, under which we “may look beyond the statutory 
elements to determine the particular part of the statute under 
 8 
 
 
B. Crime of Violence 
 
The question before us is whether sexual assault under 
§ 3124.1, which has a minimum mens rea of recklessness,
7
 is 
a crime of violence under § 16(b).  Aguilar argues that it is 
not, because he reads our precedent as barring any crime that 
can be committed recklessly from qualifying as a § 16(b) 
crime.  The government argues that, notwithstanding the 
possibility that § 3124.1 may be violated recklessly, “sexual 
assault,” as defined by that statute, is a crime of violence 
under § 16(b) because it creates a substantial risk that force 
may be used.  The preliminary issue, then, is whether, under 
                                                                                                     
which the defendant was actually convicted.”  Denis, 633 
F.3d at 206 (citation omitted).  Here, however, the categorical 
approach is sufficient because, as is set forth in detail herein, 
§ 3124.1 criminalizes only behavior that qualifies as an 
aggravated felony.  Thus, we will confine our review to the 
fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the offense.  
Oyebanji v. Gonzales, 418 F.3d 260, 262 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(citing Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602). 
7
 Section 3124.1 does not have an explicit mens rea 
requirement.  When a statute is silent as to the level of mens 
rea required to establish a material element of an offense, 
Pennsylvania law provides that “such element is established if 
a person acts intentionally, knowingly or recklessly with 
respect thereto.”  18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 302(c).  Regarding 
the mens rea required to convict Aguilar of sexual assault, the 
trial judge instructed the jury that they must find “that the 
defendant acted knowingly or at least recklessly regarding 
[the complainant‟s] nonconsent.”  (AR at 180.) 
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our precedent, the fact that a crime can be committed with a 
mens rea of recklessness necessarily disqualifies it from 
being a crime of violence under § 16(b).  We conclude that 
reckless crimes can be crimes of violence under § 16(b) 
because, under the terms of the statute and applicable case 
law, the focus must be on the risk of the intentional use of 
force, not merely on mens rea, as Aguilar urges.  However, as 
the relevant precedents are nuanced and deserving of 
discussion, we will review them first and apply the proper test 
to the crime at issue, before turning to cases examining 
similar crimes, which have consistently been held to be 
crimes of violence. 
 
1. Recklessly Committed Crimes can be 
Crimes of Violence under § 16(b) 
  
As already noted, § 16(b) provides that a crime of 
violence is “any other offense [not described in § 16(a)8] that 
is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk 
                                              
8
 As the government concedes, § 16(a) is not at issue 
in this case because § 3124.1 does not require a showing of 
force and thus does not fall within § 16(a).  As pointed out 
earlier, § 16(a) defines a crime of violence as those offenses 
that have “as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened 
use of physical force against the person or property of 
another.”  18 U.S.C. § 16(a).  Section 16(b), however, was 
crafted to include crimes that, by their nature, involve a 
substantial risk that physical force may be used in the course 
of committing the offense.  See 18 U.S.C. § 16(b).  Thus, 
§ 16(b) is broader than § 16(a),  Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 
1, 11 (2004), because it does not require that force be an 
element of the crime, see 18 U.S.C. § 16(b).   
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that physical force against the person or property of another 
may be used in the course of committing the offense.”  18 
U.S.C. § 16(b).  Mens rea is not featured in that definition, 
but both the Supreme Court and our court have considered 
mens rea when determining what constitutes a crime of 
violence under § 16(b).  Under those precedents, crimes 
involving a mens rea of negligence or of a variant of 
recklessness that we have called “pure” recklessness have 
been held not to be crimes of violence under § 16(b) because, 
by their nature, they do not raise a substantial risk that 
physical force may be used.  E.g., Tran, 414 F.3d at 465; see 
Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11 (2004).  Those precedents, 
however, do not foreclose all crimes with a mens rea of 
recklessness from qualifying as crimes of violence.  Although 
the mental state necessary to satisfy the substantive elements 
of a crime may have a bearing on the “substantial risk” 
inquiry required by § 16(b), a reckless mens rea does not 
necessarily dictate that a crime falls outside of § 16(b).  Case 
law instead follows the plain language of § 16(b) and focuses 
on whether the crime, by its nature, raises a substantial risk 
that force may be used.  Thus, a crime that can be committed 
recklessly may still qualify as a crime of violence 
under § 16(b) if that crime, by its nature, raises such a risk. 
 
In Leocal v. Ashcroft, the Supreme Court held that a 
Florida DUI offense
9
 is not a crime of violence under § 16(b) 
because “[i]n no „ordinary or natural‟ sense can it be said that 
                                              
9
 The DUI statute in Leocal “ma[de] it a third degree 
felony for a person to operate a vehicle while under the 
influence and, „by reason of such operation, caus[e] … 
[s]erious bodily injury to another.‟”  543 U.S. at 7 (quoting 
FLA. STAT. § 316.193(3)(c)(2)). 
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a person risks having to „use‟ physical force against another 
person in the course of operating a vehicle while intoxicated 
and causing injury.”  543 U.S. at 11.  The Court reasoned that 
§ 16(b): 
 
covers offenses that naturally involve a person 
acting in disregard of the risk that physical 
force might be used against another in 
committing an offense.  The reckless disregard
 
in § 16 relates not to the general conduct or to 
the possibility that harm will result from a 
person‟s conduct, but to the risk that the use of 
physical force against another might be required 
in committing a crime. 
 
Id. at 10 (emphasis added).  Though the Court held that 
§ 16(b) “require[s] a higher mens rea than the merely 
accidental or negligent conduct involved in a DUI offense,” 
id. at 11, it did so in light of its suggestion that the nature of 
the DUI crime itself, not the particular mens rea associated 
with the crime, was key in assessing the substantial risk 
required by § 16(b), see id. (“In no „ordinary or natural‟ sense 
can it be said that a person risks having to „use‟ physical force 
against another person in the course of operating a vehicle 
while intoxicated and causing injury.”).  Moreover, while the 
Court explicitly noted that it was not considering “whether a 
state or federal offense that requires proof of the reckless use 
of force against a person or property of another qualifies as a 
crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16,” id. at 13, it at least 
implied that it could qualify.  Indeed, by specifically 
emphasizing that the “disregard” in § 16(b) is a “reckless 
disregard,” Leocal supports the conclusion that crimes that 
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can be committed recklessly may sometimes be “crimes of 
violence.”  Thus, the takeaway from Leocal is its instruction 
to focus the § 16(b) analysis on whether the crime, by its 
nature, raises “a substantial risk” of “the use of force,” id. at 
10 n.7, and not on the crime‟s mens rea.   
 
After Leocal, we held in Tran that the crime of 
reckless burning or exploding
10
 was not a crime of violence 
under § 16(b).  414 F.3d at 465.  As the Supreme Court did in 
Leocal, we focused on whether the crime, by its nature, raised 
“a substantial risk that the actor will intentionally use force in 
                                              
10
 The Pennsylvania crime of reckless burning or 
exploding provides as follows: 
A person commits a felony of the third degree if 
he intentionally starts a fire or causes an 
explosion, or if he aids, counsels, pays or agrees 
to pay another to cause a fire or explosion, 
whether on his own property or on that of 
another, and thereby recklessly:  
(1) places an uninhabited building or 
unoccupied structure of another in 
danger of damage or destruction; or  
(2) places any personal property of 
another having a value that exceeds 
$5,000 or if the property is an 
automobile, airplane, motorcycle, 
motorboat or other motor-propelled 
vehicle in danger of damage or 
destruction. 
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3301(d). 
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the furtherance of the offense.”  Id. at 471.  We concluded 
that the substantial risk involved in the crime of reckless 
burning or exploding is “the risk that the fire started by the 
offender will spread and damage the property of another,” 
which “cannot be said to involve the intentional use of force.”  
Id. at 472.   
 
In our analysis, we noted that a crime like reckless 
burning or exploding, for which the mens rea is “pure” 
recklessness, could not be a crime of violence under § 16(b).  
Id. at 465.  “Pure” recklessness, which we had defined in 
United States v. Parson, exists when the mens rea of a crime 
“lack[s] an intent, desire or willingness to use force or cause 
harm at all.”11  955 F.2d 858, 866 (3d Cir. 1992), abrogated 
on other grounds by Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 
(2008).
12
  Thus, while discussing “pure” recklessness in Tran, 
                                              
11
 Parson provided the following examples of “pure” 
recklessness:   
[A] parent who leaves a young child unattended 
near a pool may risk serious injury to the child, 
but the action does not involve an intent to use 
force or otherwise harm the child.  Similarly, a 
drunk driver risks causing severe injury to 
others on the road or in the car, but in most 
cases he or she does not intend to use force to 
harm others. 
955 F.2d at 866. 
12
 In Parson, we held that a reckless endangering 
conviction was a crime of violence under § 4B1.2(a) of the 
federal sentencing guidelines.  955 F.2d at 860.  In 2008, the 
Supreme Court decided Begay, which held that a DUI 
 14 
 
we again focused the inquiry on whether the crime itself 
“involve[d] any risk of intentional harm or use of force.”  414 
F.3d at 471.  We contrasted the “pure” recklessness crime of 
reckless burning or exploding with the crime of burglary, the 
“classic example” of a crime covered by § 16(b).  Id. at 472 
(quoting Leocal, 543 U.S. at 10).  We noted that “[a] burglary 
would be covered under § 16(b) not because the offense can 
be committed in a generally reckless way or because someone 
may be injured, but because burglary, by its nature, involves 
a substantial risk that the burglar will use force against a 
victim in completing the crime.”13  Id. (quoting Leocal, 543 
U.S. at 10) (emphasis added).  Thus, as it had been in Leocal, 
                                                                                                     
conviction under New Mexico law did not fall within the 
definition of a “violent felony” under the Armed Career 
Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), since 
violent felonies were limited to offenses which “typically 
involve purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct.”  553 
U.S. at 144-45 (citation and internal quotations marks 
omitted).  Post-Begay, we have held that “a conviction for 
mere recklessness cannot constitute a crime of violence” 
under the federal sentencing guidelines.  United States v. Lee, 
612 F.3d 170, 195-97 (3d Cir. 2010). 
Though Parson was abrogated by Begay to the extent 
that Begay held that a conviction of “mere recklessness” 
cannot constitute a crime of violence under the federal 
sentencing guidelines, Parson‟s use of the term “pure” 
recklessness in the context of §16(b) was not overruled by 
Begay and is still relevant to our inquiry in this case.   
13
 “[T]he „substantial risk‟ in § 16(b) relates to the use 
of force, not to the possible effect of a person‟s conduct. …”  
Tran, 414 F.3d at 472 (quoting Leocal, 543 U.S at 10 n.7). 
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the focus in Tran was on whether the crime, by its nature, 
raises the risk of the use of physical force – not on the mens 
rea requirement in the statute of conviction. 
 
 Like Leocal, Tran supports our conclusion that some 
crimes with a minimum mens rea of recklessness can 
constitute crimes of violence under § 16(b).  Tran teaches that 
there is a subset of reckless crimes – those committed with 
“pure” recklessness – that do not fit under § 16(b) for the very 
reason that the perpetrator runs “no risk of intentionally using 
force in committing his crime.”  414 F.3d at 465.  Tran 
thereby implicitly recognizes that, when such a risk does 
exist, the crime does fall within § 16(b).  The discussion in 
Tran concerning burglary, the same “classic [§ 16(b)] 
example” cited in Leocal, also suggests that some crimes that 
can be committed recklessly will qualify as crimes of 
violence under § 16(b).  Under common law, burglary is a 
specific intent crime, see Parson, 955 F.2d at 868, the intent 
being to break and enter a dwelling at night to commit a 
felony, BLACK‟S LAW DICTIONARY 211 (8th ed. 2004).  But 
for § 16(b) purposes, what is enlightening is not the mens rea 
associated with the breaking and entering.  It is rather the risk 
of confrontation, a risk that may be only recklessly 
undertaken.  As Tran says, a “burglar has a mens rea legally 
nearly as bad as a specific intent to use force, for he or she 
recklessly risks having to [use force]” if the occupants of the 
dwelling are confronted.  414 F.3d at 471 (quoting Parson, 
955 F.2d at 866). 
 
Accordingly, Leocal and Tran teach that crimes 
carrying a mens rea of recklessness may qualify as crimes of 
violence under § 16(b) if they raise a substantial risk that the 
perpetrator will resort to intentional physical force in the 
 16 
 
course of committing the crime.  Despite that, Aguilar asserts 
that our post-Tran decisions undermine that conclusion.  The 
decisions he relies on, however, are distinguishable. 
 
First, in Popal v. Gonzales, we held that misdemeanor 
simple assault under Pennsylvania law was not a crime of 
violence under § 16.  416 F.3d 249, 251 (3d Cir. 2005).  In so 
holding, we stated that we “ha[d] recently held that crimes 
with a mens rea of recklessness do not constitute crimes of 
violence.”  Id. (citing Tran, 414 F.3d at 464).   However, as 
Aguilar concedes in his brief, only § 16(a) was at issue in 
Popal because the simple assault was not a felony, and thus 
could not qualify under § 16(b).  416 F.3d at 254.  Therefore, 
any discussion of § 16(b) was “not essential to the decision” 
in that case, and, as such, is dicta.
14
 
 
Second, in Henry v. Bureau of Immigration & Customs 
Enforcement, we held that the crime, under New York law, of 
possessing a loaded firearm with intent to use the same 
unlawfully against another, was a crime of violence under § 
16(b).  493 F.3d 303, 305-07 (3d Cir. 2007).  We noted that 
“[i]n Tran, decided after Leocal, we reaffirmed our precedent 
from [Parson], which held that … a reckless state of mind 
[does not] suffice to satisfy the requirements of §16(b).”  Id. 
at 307.  However, since the part of the statute of conviction to 
which Henry pled guilty could only have been accomplished 
intentionally, our commentary in Henry on the mens rea of 
recklessness is, again, dicta, because we were deciding if an 
intentionally committed crime was a crime of violence under 
                                              
14
 We “can, of course, accord dicta as much weight as 
we deem appropriate.”  Galli v. N.J. Meadowlands Comm’n, 
490 F.3d 265, 274 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). 
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§ 16(b) and did not need to consider the reckless mens rea 
analysis from Tran.
15
   
 
 Third, in Oyebanji v. Gonzales, we held that the crime 
of vehicular homicide under New Jersey law is not a crime of 
violence under § 16(b).  418 F.3d at 264.  Since that crime “is 
a form of reckless driving that causes death,” we found that 
“Leocal‟s reasoning seems to suggest that [vehicular 
homicide] is excluded from the category of crimes of 
violence.”   Id.  We equated the “reckless conduct” required 
for vehicular homicide with the “accidental conduct” 
referenced in Leocal‟s analysis of the Florida DUI offense,  
id. at 263-64, and specifically noted that “[i]nterpreting § 16 
to encompass accidental or negligent conduct would blur the 
distinction” between those lower mens rea offenses and the 
“„violent‟ crimes Congress sought to” be subsumed under 
§ 16(b) for “heightened punishment,” id. at 264 (quoting 
Leocal, 543 U.S. at 11).  Thus, the type of recklessness that 
the Oyebanji court found not to qualify under § 16(b) – the 
type required for vehicular homicide – only raised a 
substantial risk that accidental, not intentional, force would be 
used.   That position is similar to the one taken in Tran and 
holds open the possibility that recklessly committed crimes 
that create something more than the risk of the accidental use 
                                              
15
 Notably, Henry re-affirmed the Tran holding that 
“„§ 16(b) crimes are those raising a substantial risk that the 
actor will intentionally use force in the furtherance of the 
offense.‟”  493 F.3d at 307 (quoting Tran, 414 F.3d at 471).  
Likewise, Popal‟s discussion emphasizes that the focus of the 
§ 16(b) analysis should be on whether the crime at issue 
“involves „a substantial risk that the actor will intentionally 
use … force.‟” 416 F.3d at 255 (citing Tran, 414 F.3d at 472).    
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of force can be crimes of violence under § 16(b).  In short, 
Oyebanji‟s focus on the “accidental” use of force is akin to 
Tran‟s references to “pure” recklessness: it carves out a class 
of reckless crimes that fail to create the substantial risk of the 
use of force that is required by § 16(b).
16
   
                                              
16
 Citing to various cases from our sister circuits, 
Aguilar argues that reckless crimes cannot be crimes of 
violence under § 16(b).  Those cases are inapposite because 
they either do not involve § 16(b), or a similarly worded 
statute, or they do not create the same inherent substantial risk 
that force will be used, as § 3124.1 does.  See Jimenez-
Gonzalez v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d 557, 561 (7th Cir. 2008) 
(holding that a felony of criminal recklessness was not a 
crime of violence under § 16(b) because it “does not require 
any purposeful conduct” and “does not necessarily create a 
risk that force may be used as a means to an end during the 
commission of the offense”); United States v. Zuniga-Soto, 
527 F.3d 1110, 1125 (10th Cir. 2008) (assault of a public 
servant did not qualify as a crime of violence under 
§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) of the federal sentencing guidelines; 
however, that definition of a crime of violence has a provision 
that is substantially identical to §16(a) but does not contain 
any provision similar to the language of § 16(b)); United 
States v. Portela, 469 F.3d 496, 497 (6th Cir. 2006) (reckless 
vehicular assault was not a crime of violence under 
§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) of the federal sentencing guidelines, the 
same statute at issue in Zuniga-Soto); Fernandez-Ruiz v. 
Gonzales, 466 F.3d 1121, 1132 (9th Cir. 2006) (misdemeanor 
domestic violence assault was not a crime of violence under 
§ 16(a)); Garcia v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 465, 469 (4th Cir. 
2006) (assault in the second degree for recklessly causing 
physical injury by means of a dangerous instrument (an 
 19 
 
 
Thus, we have never categorically foreclosed the 
possibility that a recklessly committed crime may be a crime 
of violence under § 16(b), and we will not do so here.  
 
                                                                                                     
automobile) was not a crime of violence under § 16(b) 
because the reckless conduct only raised the risk that physical 
injury might occur, and not the risk that force may be used as 
required by § 16(b)). 
Aguilar also cites to the 2008 Supreme Court decision 
in Begay to support excluding from § 16(b) crimes with a 
reckless mens rea.  As discussed in footnote 12 supra, Begay 
held that a DUI conviction under New Mexico law did not 
fall within the definition of a “violent felony” under the 
ACCA since violent felonies are limited to offenses which 
“typically involve purposeful, violent, and aggressive 
conduct.”  553 U.S. at 144-45 (internal citation and quotation 
marks omitted).  However, a crime of violence under § 16(b) 
requires a different analysis than a crime of violence under 
the ACCA.  Under the ACCA, a violent felony must create a 
serious potential risk of physical injury to another.  Under 
§ 16(b), the inquiry is whether the crime creates a substantial 
risk of the use of force while committing the offense, not a 
risk of injury.  Cf. Tran, 414 F.3d at 472 (“[T]he „substantial 
risk‟ in § 16(b) relates to the use of force, not to the possible 
effect of a person‟s conduct.” (quoting Leocal, 543 U.S at 10 
n.7)). 
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2. Section 3124.1 is a Crime of Violence 
        Under § 16(b) 
 
Having established that a crime with a mens rea of 
recklessness can qualify as a crime of violence under § 16(b), 
we must next determine whether § 3124.1 in particular fits 
that definition and is hence an aggravated felony under 8 
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F).  Because we are persuaded by the 
BIA‟s reasoning that “the offense of penetrating another 
person without [that person‟s] consent necessarily disregards 
the substantial risk of physical force being used to actually 
overcome the victim‟s lack of consent,” we hold that it is a 
crime of violence under § 16(b).  (AR at 4.) 
 
Our analysis begins with the plain language of § 16(b), 
which requires that for sexual assault under § 3124.1 to be a 
crime of violence, it must be a felony and, by its nature, raise 
a substantial risk that physical force may be used during the 
commission of the offense.  18 U.S.C. § 16(b).  Because we 
are applying the formal categorical approach, we only look to 
the fact of the conviction and statutory definition of the 
offense.
17
  
                                              
17
 We emphasize that we are not making any 
determination as to when sexual conduct becomes non-
consensual intercourse and thus a crime under § 3124.1.  That 
challenge is for Pennsylvania judges and juries to decide on a 
case-by-case basis.  Here, a jury found Aguilar guilty of 
violating § 3124.1.  Under the formal categorical approach, 
we may not look past that conviction to consider his 
particular conduct in the underlying criminal case.  The 
details of what actually occurred between the victim and 
 21 
 
 
Section § 3124.1, a second degree felony under 
Pennsylvania law, makes it an offense to “engage[] in sexual 
intercourse or deviate sexual intercourse with a complainant 
without the complainant‟s consent.”18  18 PA. CONS. STAT. 
§ 3124.1.  In addition to the ordinary meaning of sexual 
intercourse, the statutory definitions of both “sexual 
intercourse” and “deviate sexual intercourse” include 
“intercourse per os or per anus” and “penetration.”  18 PA. 
CONS. STAT. § 3101.   
 
Since it is beyond dispute that sexual assault under 
§ 3124.1 is a felony, we turn to the second requirement of 
§ 16(b) and ask, using the template provided in Tran, whether 
non-consensual sexual intercourse, by its nature, creates a 
                                                                                                     
Aguilar are not part of our calculus and we make no comment 
on them. 
18
 Section 3124.1 was enacted “to fill the loophole left 
by the rape and involuntary deviate sexual intercourse statutes 
by criminalizing non-consensual sex where the perpetrator 
employs little if no force.”  Commonwealth v. Pasley, 743 
A.2d 521, 524 n.3 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999).  Aguilar argues that 
the Pennsylvania legislature‟s inclusion of force as an aspect 
of other crimes in the subchapter, including rape and 
involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, strongly indicates that 
the legislature did not anticipate that force would be 
commonly used in the commission of sexual assault under 
§ 3124.1.  The operative question, however, is not whether 
force will often be a feature of conduct charged under 
§ 3124.1 but rather whether there is a substantial risk that 
force will be used in furtherance of the offense. 
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substantial risk that the actor will intentionally use physical 
force against the victim.  See Tran, 414 F.3d at 471 (“[W]e … 
conclude that § 16(b) crimes are those raising a substantial 
risk that the actor will intentionally use force in the 
furtherance of the offense.”).  We hold that it does. 
 
As discussed in both Leocal and Tran, burglary is a 
crime of violence under § 16(b) “because burglary, by its 
nature, involves a substantial risk that the burglar will use 
force against a victim in completing the crime.”  Id. at 472 
(quoting Leocal, 543 U.S. at 10).  Just as a burglary creates a 
substantial risk that the burglar will have to use physical force 
to overcome the desire of home occupants to protect 
themselves and their property, so too does a sexual assault 
under § 3124.1, by its nature, create a substantial risk that the 
assailant will use physical force to overcome a victim‟s desire 
to protect his or her body from non-consensual sexual 
penetration.  If the risk of force created by an unlawful entry 
into a victim‟s home qualifies under § 16(b), then surely the 
risk of force when an offender is trying to enter a victim‟s 
body without consent must qualify as well. 
 
It is useful for contrast to look at the risks created by 
the crimes at issue in Tran and Leocal.  The substantial risk 
involved in reckless burning or exploding, which was 
considered in Tran, “is the risk that the fire started by the 
offender will spread and damage the property of another. … 
[which is a] risk [that] cannot be said to involve the 
intentional use of force.”  Tran, 414 F.3d at 472.  The 
offender does not have to overcome a victim.  The substantial 
risk involved in sexual assault under § 3124.1, however, is 
that, to achieve non-consensual penetration, the offender will 
intentionally use force to overcome the victim‟s natural 
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resistance against participating in unwanted intercourse.  
Thus, unlike the statute of conviction in Tran, sexual assault 
raises a risk that can certainly be said to involve the 
intentional use of force by the offender. 
 
Sexual assault is also unlike the statute of conviction at 
issue in Leocal.  The Supreme Court there determined that 
§ 16(b) “requir[ed] a higher mens rea than the merely 
accidental or negligent conduct involved in a DUI offense,”  
Leocal, 543 U.S. at 11, and concluded that a DUI offense 
could not be “shoehorn[ed]” into §16(b) because in no 
ordinary and natural sense could driving under the influence 
raise a substantial risk of having to use physical force against 
another person, id. at 11-13.  In contrast, in an ordinary and 
obvious sense, an offender risks having to intentionally use 
physical force against a victim in the course of engaging in 
non-consensual sexual intercourse.
19
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 Aguilar argues that the IJ and the BIA “both 
engaged in unwarranted speculation as to generalized 
assumptions regarding „risk‟ and „escalation‟ scenarios which 
are not categorically part of the „course of committing the 
offense.‟”  (Appellant‟s Opening Br. at 8-9.)  However, as the 
government argues, using the word “risk” in the definition of 
§ 16(b) requires an inquiry into the probabilities of human 
behavior.  The term “risk” is defined as “[t]he uncertainty of a 
result, happening, or loss; the chance of injury, damage or 
loss; esp., the existence and extent of the possibility of harm.”  
BLACK‟S LAW DICTIONARY 1353 (8th ed. 2004).  So, 
although it is true that intentional physical force may not, in 
all cases, be used during the commission of non-consensual 
sexual intercourse, that is not the proper inquiry.  Again, the 
relevant question under § 16(b) is whether there is a 
 24 
 
 
We therefore hold that sexual assault under § 3124.1, 
by its nature, raises a substantial risk that an actor will 
intentionally use force in furtherance of the non-consensual 
sexual intercourse, and, accordingly, that it constitutes a 
crime of violence under § 16(b). 
 
We note that, while this is an issue of first impression 
in our circuit, our conclusion finds ample support in decisions 
from several of our sister courts of appeals.  In United States 
v. Reyes-Castro, the Tenth Circuit held that sexual abuse of a 
child under Utah law was a crime of violence under § 16(b) 
because “by its nature it involves a substantial risk that 
physical force [may be used] against the person … of 
another.”  13 F.3d 377, 379 (10th Cir. 1993) (internal citation 
and quotation marks omitted).  In reaching that holding, the 
Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court‟s analysis of the “role 
of force in crimes where lack of victim consent is an 
element.”  Id.  The district court had analogized the statute 
concerning sexual abuse of a child to Utah‟s rape statute, 
which defined rape as “sexual intercourse … without the 
victim‟s consent,” id. (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-
402(1)), a definition that is closely similar to sexual assault 
under § 3124.1.  Because violating that rape statute was a 
crime that “involves a non-consensual act upon another 
person,” the court found that “there is a substantial risk that 
physical force may be used in the course of committing the 
offense.”  Id.  Thus, the court concluded that non-consensual 
sexual intercourse, even without physical force, would 
constitute a crime of violence under § 16(b).  Id. 
                                                                                                     
“substantial risk” that it will be used.  Non-consensual sexual 
intercourse raises that risk. 
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The Fifth Circuit, in Zaidi v. Ashcroft, held that sexual 
battery, defined by statute as “intentional touching, mauling 
or feeling of the body or private parts of any person sixteen 
(16) years of age or older, in a lewd and lascivious manner 
and without the consent of that other person,” was a crime of 
violence under § 16(b).  374 F.3d 357, 360-61 (5th Cir. 2004) 
(quoting OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1123(B)).  The 
petitioner had argued that the statute could be violated 
through an “intentional, but „nonviolent,‟ physical touching,” 
and thus should not qualify as a crime of violence.  Id. at 360.  
The Fifth Circuit disagreed, emphasizing that, “[b]ecause the 
statute at issue … presupposes a lack of consent, it 
necessarily carries with it a risk of physical force.”  Id. at 361 
(citation omitted).  The court went on to say that “the non-
consent of the victim is the touchstone for determining 
whether a given offense involves a substantial risk that 
physical force may be used in the commission of the 
offense.”20  Id.  (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
                                              
20
 Aguilar contends that Zaidi is factually 
distinguishable from his case because the statute of 
conviction in Zaidi requires intentional conduct and sexual 
assault only requires a mens rea of recklessness.  As an initial 
matter, we find it hard to believe that sexual assault under 
§ 3124.1 can be accomplished without intentional sexual 
penetration.  Further, focusing on the act – intentional sexual 
penetration in sexual assault or intentional touching in Zaidi – 
confuses the issue and is not the proper focus for § 16(b).  
That is because neither of those acts, by themselves, raise the 
substantial risk of use of force that would make them crimes 
of violence.  Indeed, they typically would not be crimes at all 
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In Sutherland v. Reno, the Second Circuit determined 
that the Massachusetts crime of “indecent assault and battery 
on a person over the age of fourteen” was a crime of violence 
under § 16(b).  228 F.3d 171, 173 (2d Cir. 2000) (Sotomayor, 
J.).  Although the language of the statute of conviction did not 
set forth the elements of the crime, case law defined it to 
include a lack of consent.
21
  See, e.g., Maghsoudi v. INS, 181 
F.3d 8, 15 (1st Cir. 1999) (noting that, under applicable 
Massachusetts law, “[l]ack of consent [i]s an element of 
indecent assault on a person fourteen or older”).  The Second 
Circuit said that it was significant that the lack of consent was 
a required element, and the court emphasized that “the 
                                                                                                     
when there is consent.  It is the non-consent of the victim in 
§ 3124.1, as it was in Zaidi,  that creates the substantial risk 
of use of physical force and transforms the act into a crime of 
violence under § 16(b).   
21
 The crime encompassed: 
[a] touching ... [that] when, judged by the 
normative standard of societal mores, is 
violative of social and behavioral expectations, 
in a manner which is fundamentally offensive to 
contemporary moral values and which the 
common sense of society would regard as 
immodest, immoral, and improper.  So defined 
the term indecent affords a reasonable 
opportunity for a person of ordinary intelligence 
to know what is prohibited. 
Id. at 176 (quoting Commonwealth v. Lavigne, 676 
N.E.2d 1170, 1172 (1997)).  
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existence of lack of consent by the victim … by its nature, 
presents a substantial risk that force may be used in order to 
overcome the victim‟s lack of consent and accomplish the 
indecent touching.”  Sutherland, 228 F.3d at 176 (internal 
citations and quotation marks omitted).   In support of that 
contention, the court referenced an Eighth Circuit case, 
United States v. Rodriguez, which held: 
 
[T]he statutory language “may” and “substantial 
risk” must not be ignored. All crimes which by 
their nature involve a substantial risk of 
physical force share the risk of harm. It matters 
not one whit whether the risk ultimately causes 
actual harm. Our scrutiny ends upon a finding 
that the risk of violence is present. 
 
979 F.2d 138, 141 (8th Cir. 1992). 
 
 Though not decided in the context of § 16(b), another 
case provides support for the proposition that the non-consent 
of the victim is a “touchstone” for determining whether an 
offense raises a substantial risk that force will be used during 
the commission of an offense.  In United States v. Rooks, the 
Tenth Circuit concluded that third degree sexual assault under 
Texas law constituted a crime of violence under § 4B1.2(a) of 
the federal sentencing guidelines.
22
  556 F.3d 1145, 1152 
(10th Cir. 2009).  Finding the Supreme Court‟s decision in 
Begay instructive, the Rooks court concluded that “[s]exual 
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 Specifically, Rooks was convicted of intentionally or 
knowingly causing sexual penetration of a person without that 
person‟s consent.  Rooks, 556 F.3d at 1146.   
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assault involving intentional penetration without consent is 
similar in kind as well as in degree of risk posed to the 
example crimes set forth in § 4B1.2(a)‟s commentary.” 23  Id. 
at 1150 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).  The 
Rooks court also found that “[t]he risk of confrontation, 
another indicator of violent and aggressive conduct, is 
inherent in non-consensual sexual encounters.”  Id. at 1151 
(internal citation omitted).
24
   
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, the BIA did not err in 
holding that Aguilar‟s offense was a crime of violence under 
§ 16(b), and thus an aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(43)(F).  We will therefore deny Aguilar‟s petition 
for review.  
                                              
23
 The example crimes in § 4B1.2(a)‟s commentary 
include “murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated 
assault, forcible sex offenses, robbery, arson, extortion, 
extortionate extension of credit, and burglary of a dwelling.”  
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.2 cmt. n.1. 
24
 A crime of violence under § 16(b) and a crime of 
violence under § 4B1.2(a) do not have identical inquiries 
because the former focuses on the risk that force may be used 
and the latter, like the ACCA, focuses on the risk that 
physical injury may occur.  See Leocal, 543 U.S. at 10 n.7.  
However, the analysis in Rooks regarding the effect of non-
consensual sexual penetration is instructive to the inquiry 
required under § 16(b) and generally provides support for the 
contention that non-consensual sexual penetration is a crime 
of violence. 
